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1 The view of early modern natural law – especially Grotius and Pufendorf – as seeking to
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Pufendorf’s natural law in Saastamoinen 1995, 16–17 and passim.
FORMALISM, FRAGMENTATION, FREEDOM
KANTIAN THEMES IN TODAY’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
Martti Koskenniemi*
International lawyers have always been surprised, and often embarrassed, as theyreach the middle of Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) to find that he dismissed
the fathers of international law – Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel – as ‘leidige Tröster’,
sorry comforters (Kant, 1991 [1795], 103). Why would Kant wish to attack this most
significant attempt so far to humanise the relations between nations at war and to
construct what Pufendorf called ‘universal jurisprudence’? Surely Kant did not quite
mean what he was saying…
I would like to suggest that Kant’s dismissal of the early modern tradition of jus
naturae et gentium, natural and international law, resonates with themes prevalent in
today’s international world. That tradition was born in an age as sceptical as ours.1 It
aimed to create a scientific law more geometrico, out of combining the only thing we
could be certain of in social life – that human beings were egoistic – with an
argument according to which egoism could best flourish in conditions of legal
constraint. Here is Pufendorf, writing in 1673, about the purpose of the state and the
law of the state:
The over-riding purpose of states is that, by mutual cooperation and assistance, men
may be safe from the losses and injuries which they may and do inflict on each
other. To obtain from those with whom we are united in one society, it is not
enough that we make agreement with each other not to inflict injuries on each other,
nor even that the bare will of a superior be made known to citizens; fear of
punishment is needed and the capacity to inflict it immediately. To achieve its
purpose, the penalty must be nicely judged, so that it clearly costs more to break the
law than to observe it; the severity of the penalty must outweigh the pleasure or
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profit won or expected from wrongdoing. For men cannot help choosing the lesser
of two evils. (Pufendorf 1991 [1673], Bk II, Ch 7, 139–140.)
Everything about this would be later objectionable to Kant: the reduction of states
into mechanisms for avoiding ‘losses and injuries’; the view of obedience to law
based on a calculation of costs and benefits; and the image of human beings as
passive slaves to their pleasures. Kant seems to be saying that modern natural law
offered security and well-being at too high a price, human freedom. I cannot think of
a more relevant argument today.
A recent issue of the American Journal of International Law, the most widely
read periodical in the field, carried two lead articles. One was titled ‘The Customary
International Law Game’. The authors use a prisoner’s dilemma scenario to show, as
they say, ‘that contrary to the arguments of some critics, it is plausible that states
would comply with customary international law under some conditions’ (Norman &
Trachtman 2005). The other one – titled ‘Form and Substance in International
Agreements’ – explored the ‘design features’ of international conventions, outlining
how trade-offs between such features ‘deepens our perception of agreement dynamics
and can contribute to the design of more effective and robust international accords’
(Raustiala 2005).
There were no other articles in that issue, just shorter comments and reviews.
Both texts were intended to defend international law against critics suggesting that it
provides neither effective nor legitimate regulation of international matters. I am in
sympathy with the authors. But I am puzzled about the taking away of ‘law’ from
international law analyses of this type, replacing it by a vocabulary of empirical
political science, techniques and strategies to reach the interests or objectives
assumed to stand ‘behind’ law and to have a reality or importance far greater than it.
Do not remain enchanted by the form, these authors are saying. Look behind the rules
to their consequences and their acceptability in the eyes of audiences that count.
Assess costs and benefits. Calculate.
This is Pufendorf attacking the Lutheran Aristotelianism of his time; mocking
the monstrum of the Holy Roman Empire, fragmented in so many ways like the
present international world, looking for a novel vocabulary to streamline law with
recent scientific advances in the battle against anarchy and scepticism.2 This is
Pufendorf, led from a justified concern about how to create order among free and
self-loving individuals – and States – to a melancholy defence of (rationalized)
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absolutism.3 Like the tradition of early modern natural law, today’s internationalists
view law in fully instrumental terms – as a tool for making nations ‘behave’ –
celebrating the narrowest forms of technical and economic expertise as access-points
to global rule (see further Koskenniemi 2007a).
This paper will consist of three parts. I will begin by laying out a Kantian
alternative to empirical natural law – formalism – and the critiques of formalism as
they have enfolded within international law. Second, I will run through elements of
the novel jurisprudentia universalis as a technical and empirical science. Finally, I
will end with a few proto-Kantian responses about the possible relationship of
(international) law to freedom today.
1. Formalism and its detractors
1.1 A political formalism?
There are many ways to set out the Kantian critique of early modern natural law. This
seems to confuse the empirical and the rational: a law that seeks the fulfilment of
pleasure will necessarily fall short of universal. For it, law has no normative weight
of its own, independent of the weight of what it wants to achieve. Its moral
anthropology is that of the homo economicus; its practice is that of managerial
control. A law that only looks for security and the realisation of desire has no concept
of obligation; all that counts is what effectively works. Freedom is undermined in two
ways: by doing away the distinction between human society and natural history, and
by reducing human relationships to instrumental terms.4
It is with this background that I want to examine the power of Kant’s formalism,
formalism sans peur et sans reproche, against the novel natural law of empirical
political science, offered as an invitation to ‘international relations’. For such
formalism, the point of law is neither punishment nor control but the freedom that is
offered to legal subjects in a society governed by the rule of law. Law’s virtue, from
this perspective, lies not in what it does, but in its being law. This is the normal
starting-point for analyses of Kant’s Rechtslehre. But let me start from the Critique
of Pure Reason in which Kant observes that no rules lay out the conditions of their
own application (Kant 1991 [1781], 140–141 [A132–134]). In this regard, Kant
seems to suggest, the legislator will always fail. Law cannot be used as a technique of
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control: everything will be left to the judgement by the law-applier – a faculty that
‘does not and cannot require instruction but only exercise’ (Kant 1991 [1781], 140).
A Kantian such as Hans Kelsen  agrees. There is no more striking sentence in the
1934 edition of Reine Rechtslehre than this:
[…] there is no criterion on the basis of which one of the possibilities given within
the frame of the norm to be applied could be favoured over the other possibilities.
(Kelsen 1992, 81.)
The meaning of a legal norm is ‘a problem not of legal theory but of legal policy’.5
But how is it that legal formalism as theory leads into a conception of legal practice
that is thoroughly political? Can formalism – the fidelity to law – and legal
indeterminacy be reconcilable? Kant as critical legal studies?
1.2 Critiques of formalism
Formalism is a bad word. It tends to denote that which is abstract, inflexible, cold,
and insensitive to the requirements of social life; lazy, bureaucratic and superficial.
Generations of international lawyers have attacked their opponents as ‘formalists’. In
the 19th century European customary law and civilization became a robust antithesis
to French revolutionary abstractions. After the First World War, lawyers attacked the
pre-war absolutism of formal sovereignty, celebrating trade and interdependence as
the law’s anti-formal foundation. The drafters of the United Nations Charter, again,
rejected what they saw as the failed legalism of the League Covenant. And policy-
oriented jurisprudence in the 1950's and 1970's always accused international law as
holding fast to the dead forms of diplomacy.6
Two critiques of formalism are everywhere. One sees the formalism of an
international system of sovereign equality that puts democratic and rogue states on
the same footing as moral anathema and uses a moral language to articulate the idea
of an ‘international community’ beyond formal statehood (see e.g. Buchanan 2004).
Another points to the uselessness of formal rules as techniques of management and
control of a functionally diversified world. Such rules are over-inclusive and under-
inclusive – covering cases we would not wish to cover, and not applying in situations
where we think they should be applied. Instead of the anachronistic forms of
diplomacy we associate with States, we need effective management of goal-oriented
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regimes. Instead of backward-looking formal rules, we need forward-looking
decision-making by experts. Hence specialisation: a global trade system managed by
trade experts at the WTO, an environmental system managed by environmental
experts, human rights by human rights experts, security by security experts and so on.
As  func t iona l  r equ i r emen t s  domina t e ,  f o r ma l  d i s t i nct ions  between
national/international, public/private, political/technical, lose their sense perhaps like
the scholastic categories that Pufendorf wanted to set aside from preventing the
rational management of modern Germany.
Thus we are presented with an image of transnational or global law whose
behavioural directives are no longer linked to any (formal) idea of an international
public realm (even less of course to that of a world federation) but are being produced
and managed by experts and private stakeholders in accordance with diversified
functional requirements.7  Best practices, standard technologies and de facto
expectations take over the space of international normativity. What little is left of
formal law is reduced to a frame for negotia t ion and adjustment . Equity,
proportionality and soft law pay homage to functional discretion. Even rights turn
into rights-regimes within which experts balance conflicting values: freedom versus
security; ownership versus health; individual rights versus communal identities.
Everything is fluid, negotiable, revisable. (See Koskenniemi 2007b.) Only the
optimum counts. Figure out the costs and benefits. The bomb is ticking and torture
might save lives. Should the innocent always be sacrificed to the empty formulation
of the rule?
2. Fragmentation
The turn from status to contract, or from form to function. This is what international
lawyers today call fragmentation. It is not only about technical specialisation; it is
about a profound change in the organisation of faith and power, on a par with the
transformation of ecclesiastic and civil organisation in Pufendorf’s day. The ethos of
law and republicanism are replaced by individual interests, strategic planning and
technical networks; formal sovereignty replaced by disciplinary power; constraint
received from cognitive instead of normative vocabularies. Six steps inaugurate a
novel disciplinary vocabulary of international relations that seeks to replace the
civilizing antics of the old legal faith.
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2.1 From institutions to ‘regimes’
The first step lies in thinking about norm-complexes not in terms of public law
institutions but as informal ‘regimes’, that is norms, practices and expectations within
specific ‘issue-areas’, defined by the distribution of available technologies of
knowledge-production. Where the law of international institutions focused on formal
competence, representation and accountability, regime theory is thoroughly
functional, measuring outputs against inputs by reference to alternative behavioural
‘models’.8
How do regimes emerge? By redescriptions of the world through novel
languages that empower novel groups. Think, for example, the spectacular rise of
environmental law out of an outdated vocabulary of territorial sovereignty or about
the characterization of certain interests or preferences as the ‘human rights’ of those
claiming them. Lex mercatoria may still lack the orthodox text book and case
collection – but look ins ide transnat ional law firms and you will find an
unproblematic routine of transcribing contract terms under new standard formulas to
articulate (in English) the voices of dominant clients whose field of operation
transcends any territorially limited system of control.9
These vocabularies are written in the grammar of strategic action: experts use
them to decide on a case-by-case basis.  Hence the concern with ‘regime design’.
Variables such as membership, scope, degree of centralisation, control by members
and flexibility may be introduced to bring about optimal results.10 As noted by one of
its fathers, it is the point of regime-theory to focus on observational behaviour so as
to avoid ‘slipping into formalism’ (the expression is his), exemplified (for him) by
the scandalous way in which instruments such as the 1927 Kellogg-Briand Pact had
been thought of as ‘law’ ‘even though they had no behavioural implications’
(Keohane 1993, 27).
2.2 From rules to ‘regulation’
A second anti-formal step collapses the distinction between law and ‘regulation’. In
regimes, the use of hard law (‘legalization’) is a policy-choice sometimes dictated by
strategic interests, sometimes not. Hard law is often difficult to attain, and costly to
manage. But sometimes it may be a forceful instrument – think for example the way
functional systems such as the WTO are being articulated in constitutional language
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so as to emphasise the solemnity of its decision-making (see Cass 2005). The relevant
literature is full of analyses of harder and softer techniques of regulation, using
variables such as obligation, precision and delegation, for instance, to canvass the
alternatives.11
The move from law to regulation highlights the need for control. Because the
targeted audiences are assumed to behave as strategic actors, the inducements must
become equally strategic: sometimes sticks, sometimes carrots. Sometimes
disagreements are managed (‘problems are resolved’) through assistance or
‘facilitation’, sometimes by negotiation or administratively ordered sanctions, rarely
through formal settlement. Soft law alternates with hard, private constraint with
public, as normative politics is replaced by what the experts call ‘new global division
of regulatory labour’. (Lipschutz & Fogel 2002, 117.)
Academic research on regulation is thoroughly instrumental. Its outcomes are
presented as variables to strengthen the regime. Research and policy-making become
indistinguishable. As proudly exclaimed by a recent s tudy on international
institutions:
[…] our approach also provides an appropriate formulation for prescribing policy
and evaluating existing institutions. (Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal 2001, 767.)
No doubt, Pufendorf would have been thrilled. All actors are understood in a
thoroughly mechanical light: as functions of the regime’s regulatory ‘objectives’.
2.3 From government to ‘governance’
A third step consists in a move from a vocabulary of formal ‘government’ to informal
‘governance’. As a recent enthusiast about collaboration between international
lawyers and international relations experts argues, what now is needed, is to think of
international lawyers as ‘architects of global governance’ (Abbott 2004, 11). Now if
‘government’ connotes administration and division of powers, with the presumption
of formal accountability, ‘governance’ refers to de facto practices and is – like those
corporate enterprises in which the term originates – geared for production of maximal
value for the stakeholders.12
Globalisation organises special interests in functionally diversified regimes of
global governance as global control. Because there is no superior standpoint that
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would assess the relative value of each regime, or their hierarchical place in some
global federation, the regimes re-create within themselves the sovereignty lost from
the nation-State – though no longer so much in normative as in cognitive terms, not
as rule-regimes but as truth-regimes.13 This is what makes the international world of
autonomous regimes so much like the monstrum of Pufendorf’s Holy Roman
Empire.14
2.4 From responsibility to ‘compliance’
The fourth replacement is the move away from the backward looking obsession
lawyers have with formal conformity, breach of law in accordance with the binary
code illegal/legal declared in formal dispute-settlement, courts in particular, typically
requiring reparation of damage and guarantees of non-repetition. As a mechanism of
deterrence, responsibility will fail in an international context where routines are few,
situations idiosyncratic and interests great. In such cases formal lawfulness is of
relatively minor importance and insisting on it often counter-productive.15
Invoking responsibility might even seem a net loss for the regime. A formal
declarat ion of illegality would too easily undermine solidarity and general
commitment to regime objectives. Hence, instead of ‘breach’, new environmental and
economic treaties speak of ‘non-compliance’ and ‘non-violation complaints’ and
instead of formal responsibility, set up mechanisms for reporting, discussion and
economic and technical assistance: informal pressure and subtle persuasion act as
socially embedded guarantees for conforming behaviour (see e.g. Kuokkanen 2006).
2.5 From law to ‘legitimacy’
The foregoing four steps all point away from normative to empirical vocabularies that
cannot distinguish between coercion and the law, the gunman and the taxman. How
to make that distinction? How – to draw again a parallel – to accept Hobbes but
sound like Grotius? This was Pufendorf’s question, too, to which modern political
science responds by the vocabulary of ‘legitimacy’.16 What is it? Conceptual history
tells us that the earliest uses of ‘legitimacy’ coincided with ‘legality’. Something was
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legitimate when it was lawful. This, however, is not the regime-analysts ‘normative
optic’. Instead, they wish to ask the further question: Why should law be obeyed?
When Western experts claimed that the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 might have
been illegal, but was quite legitimate, their point was precisely to find a normative
vocabulary overriding formal validity.
This, however, tends to collapse legitimacy into the pre-modern problem of the
political ‘good’. Yet as Thomas Franck, echoing Pufendorf, asks rhetorically in a
leading work on international legitimacy: ‘When different belief systems contend,
what can one say about the justice of rules?’ (Franck 1990, 210–211.) Regimes,
governance and compliance are needed precisely between morally disagreeing agents.
‘Fairness’ and ‘legitimacy’ are mediate concepts, rhetorically successful if they
cannot be pinned down either to formal rules or moral principles. Ian Hurd, for
example, writes of legitimacy as ‘a kind of feeling’ about authority and ‘a sense of
moral obligation’.17 As such – as a ‘feeling’ – it opens itself to empirical study. The
political scientist only describes the ‘operative process’ whereby this ‘feeling’
emerges though ‘internalization by the author of an external standard’ (Hurd 1999,
388). Legitimacy becomes a psychological fact indifferent to the conditions of its
existence: fear, desire, manipulation, whatever. This is how Marcuse once analysed
American democracy studies:
[…] the criteria for judging a given state of affairs are those offered by…the given
state of affairs. The analysis is ‘locked’; the range of judgment is confined within a
context of facts which excludes judging the context in which the facts are made,
man-made, and in which their meaning, function, and development, are determined.
(Marcuse 1991, 115–116.)
Legitimacy is ideological not because it opens the door for dubious moral ideas but
through embedding the vocabulary of ‘legitimacy’ itself and thus the authority of the
profession that speaks it. The more there is noise about ‘legitimacy’, the less we are
able to hear whatever ‘law’ or ‘morality’ might say. Legitimacy is not about
normative substance. Its point is to avoid such substance but nonetheless to uphold a
semblance of substance. Hence its suitability for endless reproduction within the
communications industry, including the academic publication industry.18
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‘Legitimacy’ is not about norms but about strategic action. As Chayes and
Chayes put it in their widely used work on compliance with international agreements:
The American people have not always understood that even when the United States
has the military or economic power to act alone, the effectiveness of its actions
might be undermined if it did not seek and achieve a degree of international
consensus to give its actions legitimacy. (Chayes & Handler Chayes 1995, 41.)
The perspective is control. The normative framework is in place. Action has been
decided. The only remaining question is how to reach the target with minimal cost.
This is where legitimacy is needed – to ensure a warm feeling in the audience.
Legitimacy sets up an Ersatz normativity to replace the conservatism of formal
law as well as the arbitrariness of justice. For as fragmented consciousness stands in
awe before the breath-taking generalisations by globalization experts, anything that
looks like a reassuring normative language – even ‘legitimacy’ – can be internalised.
It is not a language against which power might be assessed but a vocabulary
produced and reproduced by power. ‘Legitimacy’ enables the political scientist to
fight modernity’s political battles without its heavy armoury, by only flashing some
well-used weapon from its arsenal, with the expectation that potential adversaries
would not  even enter  the f ight  by exhaust ion due to  the memory of  i t s
inconclusiveness.
2.6. From lawyers to international relations experts
The sixth, final move is a shift in disciplinary power – from law to international
relations. In the 1990's lawyers began to hear an invitation to collaboration with
international relations experts at US universities.19 A discipline had arisen that
addressed the same world that international lawyers had addressed but with a
complex technical vocabulary about compliance and conformity, prisoners dilemmas,
dependent and independent variables, strategic action and rational choice. Classical
realism had given way to empirical studies with normative tinge. The ‘dual agenda’
soon became a ‘liberal agenda’ (Slaughter 1995).
Very little ‘collaboration’ followed outside the US. This is understandable. For
it would have meant replacing the vocabulary of international law by instrumental
political science. If the five steps are taken seriously, nothing is left of law. If, as
regime experts argue, ‘governments will negotiate agreements and establish
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institutional rules that they intend to follow in any case’ (Kahler 2000, 673), then law
becomes fully epiphenomenal. Why would anyone care?
In a book published two years ago, Jack Goldsmith – the author of a memo on
transferring prisoners from Afghanistan to places where they can be tortured, but now
Professor at Harvard Law School (Goldsmith 2004) – and Eric Posner from Chicago
argue that the traditional defence of international law – that most states abide by most
international law rules most of the time – is true only because of the way lawyers
dress actual behaviour as law. But this provides no explanation for why States behave
as they do. If, as they argue, State behaviour is caused by, and should be explained by
reference, ‘coincidence of interest and coercion’, then to say that it embodies ‘law’ is
an irrelevant decoration on it. As Goldsmith and Posner claim: ‘we have explained
the logic of treaties without reference to the notions of “legality” or pacta sunt
servanda or related concepts’ (Goldsmith & Posner 2005, 90).
For these analysts, treaties are bargains between rational egoists seeking to
resolve co-ordination or co-operation problems so as to minimise transaction costs
resulting from unclear communication of their expectations under customary law (id.
84–85). States do not comply because treaties have ‘binding force’ but ‘because they
fear retaliation from the other state or some kind of reputational loss, or because they
fear a failure of coordination (id. 90)’. Treaties are surfaces over which parties
exercise pressure against each other. Thus, for example, provisions on the use of
force in the UN Charter constitute a bargain States once made to have protection.
That bargain is now undermined by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by
terrorists of ‘rogue states’. Hence, for States as rational egoists, the ‘costs of strict
adherence to the UN Charter in a world of new security threats’ has just become too
great (Yoo & Trachman 2005, 384).
The vocabularies of ‘consent’, ‘validity’ or ‘dispute settlement’ are replaced by
the social science vocabular ies of ‘exp la ining’ behaviour and at taining
‘compliance’. 2 0  And because achieving compliance is all that counts , the
interdisciplinary call is not really about co-operation but conquest. No wonder
Goldsmith and Posner conclude: ‘There is a more sophisticated international law
literature in the international relations subfield of political science’ (Goldsmith &
Posner 2005, 15).
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3. Between constraint and freedom
We now have the elements of the (economically oriented) post-modern natural law in
place:21 the move from formal institutions to functional regimes, the replacement of
general rules by amorphous commands called ‘regulation’, the turn from government
into governance and from legal responsibility to factual compliance. The normative
optic is received from a ‘legitimacy’, measured by international relations – a
discipline performing as Supreme Tribunal of a managerial world.
This brings us back to Kant’s critique of Pufendorf. If law is defined as what
causes compliance, then the distinction between power and law is lost. Pufendorf
was, after all, a theorist of absolutism. If one tries to introduce that distinction by
‘legitimacy’, then one owes an explanation of how that is different from assessing
either lawfulness or justice of the Prince.22 The former tack would re-create the
danger of formalism and the latter that of radical arbitrariness from which it was the
point of natural law to liberate us. Reducing legitimacy to a ‘feeling’ – jouissance –
falls back into power as ideology. For Kant, this was no news. Empirical arguments
about conformity or the masochistic happiness induced by conformity cannot reach
the moral law. Nothing sounds more like self-imposed immaturity – the contrary to
enlightenment – than orienting oneself by one’s ‘feelings’ (of pleasure). The question
that remains is about whether you deserve your jouissance.
But the threshold between pleasure and pain is easy to cross; and as empiricism
fails on its own terms, it will always cross it. In the Appendix to ‘Perpetual Peace’,
Kant introduces the distinction between the ‘political moralist’ and the ‘moral
politician’. The former, he writes, ‘makes the principles subordinate to the end’ (Kant
1991 [1795], 118–121). These ends have no independence from the ends of some
people, namely those in a position to constrain others, and their academic advisers.
Today’s constraint will begin to seem natural as it exists for the sake of future
happiness – eternally postponed happiness.  As the end remains elusive – think of
Iraq, or the ‘war on terror’ – nothing limits the means to be employed. The
progression from the future happiness of all to the imperative necessity to torture
many now follows, as Kant suggests, from properties internal to natural law –
international relations – itself.
If the objective of law is defined as happiness, then it must be less than universal:
but what access have we to the happiness of others? And what guarantee that the
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happiness of some would not entail the unhappiness of others? Is humanitarian
intervention allowed under the UN Charter? Well, yes and no, the lawyer would
respond. The Charter is both for peace and for human rights. Beyond that, there is
only speculation about what should be a useful, good, way to apply it. It is not that
these questions cannot be decided but how they should be decided. The UN Charter
is not only about peace and war. It is also about jurisdiction and the competence to
decide. No legal rule exists alone, like an island in the sea of arbitrary choices. It is
linked to other rules, both substantive and procedural. Together, they represent the
legal system that becomes concrete in judgments produced by competent institutions.
We may have opinions about particular rule-applications and, as Kant would insist,
we should debate those in conditions of free public exchange – but we may not doubt
the legal validity of competent judgments. Their ‘validity’ is not simply their
‘usefulness’ from some perspective or their ‘goodness’ under some scale of value. It
signifies their claim of being ‘right’ in the legal system of which they are a part.
Yet this is not a commitment to passivity.23 There might well be sometimes good
reason for disobedience – perhaps Kosovo in 1999 was one such situation, certainly
also some of the administrative dictates in the ‘fight against terrorism’ are. A serious
formalism is not commitment to a particular institution or a particular understanding
of a rule. It is committed to the idea of law as a system of universal right and of
assessing any institution, rule or judgment in view of that idea. Thus it will certainly
sometimes – perhaps often – deviate from the mainstream judgment that reproduces
the structural bias of the relevant institution.24 But its challenge is always a legal
challenge, a challenge for the legal accountability of those responsible, or a call for
legislative change. It is not an intervention in expert debates within closed chambers
and through vocabularies that cannot articulate the weight of the legal system itself,
the weight of the universal ideal of the institution against which its actions must be
assessed. That weight, Kant would say, is the weight of freedom, not only of the
political strategists and program-managers but – to give an example – of the 500
Serbians killed by the NATO bombings in 1999, and of all of us, affected by the
lowering of the threshold of political violence. (See further Koskenniemi 2002.)
International relations experts would respond by stressing the need of
‘balancing’? But what items would go into the ‘balance’, and how would they be
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25 See e.g. Hont 2006. For an analysis of neo-feudal processes of contract and legislation
through negotiation between (powerful) special interests, see Supiot 2005, 162–175, 243–273.
26 Perhaps oddly, when the IR scholar turns into an analysis of the American constitution, she
will make points about the will of the founding fathers and the intrinsic meaning of the words
in the fourteenth amendment that will make a European lawyer look like an amateur formalist.
See e.g. Goldsmith & Bradley 2005.
measured? Would future happiness count the same as present – or the happiness of
those who are absent? Hobbes had an answer to such questions – Wer kann, darf
auch – and Pufendorf dressed essentially the same response in a more appealing garb.
The world of calculation may be indeterminate in substance, but highly significant in
pointing out who shall decide, quis judicabit. Hobbes might have thought of the
Leviathan, but soon after his time the Leviathan began its descent into an
instrumentality for special interests: economy, technology, identity. The King’s body
became a calculating machine in which the ‘social’ was arranged as a set of
ostensibly private hierarchies: citizens conceived as rational egoists, the Leviathan as
a homo economicus.25 Andersen’s tale is reversed; we see bright-coloured clothes
with exotic fabrics, with the King shrinking into insignificance beneath them, until
the clothes finally begin to bear themselves. This is the international world of regimes
not of law but of truths, each computing compliance in accordance with its special
logic, outside politics and contestation: the hubris of instrumental knowledge.
Talk about compliance presumes the knowability of what there is to comply
with, namely that the instrument, policy, regulation has one clear meaning instead of
another. But as every lawyer knows, nobody is ever in breach, everybody is always
complying, though perhaps in an unorthodox way – invoking a counter-principle for
a principle, an exception for a rule. The international relations expert, however, has
no time for lawyers’ talk ‘on the one hand – on the other hand’. Now let’s get on with
it! And thus the expert reveals his bad faith, the belief that his texts or policies do not
suffer from the problems that infected the lawyer’s texts or principles. He will have
to think that his purposes are fully determinate and form a harmonious whole.26  This
is not just formalism, this is a caricature of 19th century Gesetzpositivismus – with
the twist, however, that the guiding policy – objective, interest, value – is not argued
but taken for granted. This seems easy, because the ‘political moralists’ already know
how to decide what to do. As Kant pointed out, they will always find a strategic
consideration that justifies putting other people into harm’s way and thus putting:
[…] man into the same class as other living machines which only need to realise
consciously that they are not free beings for them to become in their own eyes the
most wretched of all earthy creatures. (Kant 1991 [1795], 123.)
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Rational choice presumes that the interests of actors are knowable, like facts of
nature, and derives behavioural directives from those interests to apply them in an
empirical world. Each step along the way is vulnerable to Kantian doubts about the
limits of pure reason. The premises of the experts can only be justified by their own
conclusions: the noumenal world remains beyond reach. Is the Doha round about
development or trade? Is UN reform about security or human rights? And what do
‘security’ or ‘rights’ mean? The answer will depend on which expert you will ask –
whose categories you will employ. But even if one knew whom to ask, perpetual
peace could still not be reached by prudential calculations alone. Fortuna affects any
settlement; something argued good for all will prove bad for many. Expert discourses
are just as indeterminate as law; truth regimes just as conflicting, internally
contradictory and uncertain. Such regimes and interest-analyses are just as ‘formal’
as law – texts and presuppositions, surfaces on which political conflict is translated as
professional disagreement. In the end, the problem is never formalism – for that
cannot be avoided – but whose formalism, and equipped with what bias?
4. International law and freedom
So I come finally to the relationship of international law and freedom. As Kant’s
‘political moralists’ (international relations scholars, compliance experts) look
beyond the law in order to reach happiness, welfare, growth, whatever they deem
desirable, they reduce others to instruments of their own preference. The more they
insist they will also provide for the happiness of others, the less they are able to think
of those others as free. Against these, Kant puts the ‘moral politician’, the formalist
whose fidelity is to the law, not to its hypothesised objectives, the law understood as
the ‘sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the
choice of another in accordance with the universal law of freedom’ (Kant 1996
[1797], 24).
This is the famous condition of right. It is a condition of indeterminacy: after all,
rules do not spell out the conditions of their application. (Kant 1991 [1781], 140–141
[A132–134].) Judgment is needed when we move from the legal form to the decision.
It is this fact that the natural lawyer and the international relations expert find so
difficult to come to terms with. Hence they run away from judgment by imagining
their technical vocabularies – that is to say, the institutional bias of their discipline –
as controlling. But of course, it was the very point of the critique of pure reason to
close this avenue. Kant attacked rationalist utopianism (the Leibniz-Wolff school)
and the apologies of empirical civil philosophy (Pufendorf, Vattel) precisely by
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27 This is what Kant calls ‘Abderitism’, history as the ‘hopeless task of rolling the stone of
Sisyphus uphill, only to let it roll back again’. Kant 1991 [1798], 179–180.
28 On this, see especially Goyard-Fabre 2004, 68–70, 79–84.
privileging practical reason over theoretical reason, normative judgment over
instrumental calculation (See Renaut 1997, 150–184).
For the natural lawyer – the international relations expert – law is a tactic
through which an unproblematic subject acts upon the external world in fully
instrumental terms. The social world is an extension of the natural world, a surface
for the fulfilment of interests, realisation of desires, search for security. As political
realists from Moses Mendelssohn (Kant’s target) and Hans Morgenthau to Robert
Kagan have seen it, the world is pure immanence.27 Politics – like nature – is the
eternal recurrence of the same: struggle for power. From Thucydides to Rumsfeld,
nothing has changed. We are trapped in an anthropological iron cage: while rulers
change, the character of rulership does not.
With Kant, however, truth vocabularies run out and one judges only particulars.
What is the appropriate mindset in that case? Here the Kantian fidelity to the law
transforms into that which Weber would have named a calling, consciousness that
deciding in public office will always implicate choice and responsibility. It is a
normative-political (instead of instrumental-technical) task subject to practical
contestation, not expert calculation. To think of it in terms of causality and control is
to think of it in terms of pure immanence – the glorification of today. To think it in
terms of law, by contrast, is to situate the decision in an ideal relationship with others.
Instead of endless repetition, history becomes an open horizon where also the
deciding subject’s own subjectivity is at stake. The judgment will have to defer to a
universal cr iter ion against which the decision-maker’s own prejudices and
conclusions must in turn be measured.
Kant’s teleology – the idea of a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose
(see especially Kant 1991 [1784]) – has been one of the most frequently discarded
aspects of his political theory. Yet it was not meant as an objective (‘natural’) truth
about the future but a regulative idea for the use of practical judgment. (Kant 2000
[1790], § 74, 266–268). It is hard to see how anything like a normative vocabulary –
that is, a judgment implicating the idea of obligation – could exist without a view of
progress. Standards such as the ‘perfect civil constitution’, or ‘perpetual peace’ are
implied in any normative judgment and – perhaps above all – in any critique of the
failure of judgment. As Kant makes clear, these objectives do not constitute a positive
programme, even less a set of proposed institutions, the European Union, the United
Nations, or the like.28 They set a horizon that one works towards through education
and practice and that one uses as a public standard of criticism of any present
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29 Kant 1991 [1781], 140–141 (A132–134). The exercise of judgment, Kant notes, requires
‘mother wit’ for which there are no rules and ‘ the want of which no schooling can
compensate’. Although Kant here says in a footnote (note 1, p. 140), that ‘[d]eficiency in
judgment is properly that which is called stupidity’, in later writings, especially in the Third
Critique, his assessment is less harsh.
30 The lightness of Kant’s irony as he dresses the struggle for freedom in conditions where the
critique of theoretical reason has done its work cannot be bettered: ‘So the question is no
longer whether perpetual peace is something real or a fiction, and whether we are not
deceiving ourselves in our theoretical judgment when we assume that it is real. Instead, we
must act as if it is something real, though perhaps it is not; we must work for establishing
perpetual peace and the kind of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say,
republicanism of all states, together and separately) in order to bring about perpetual peace…
And even if the complete realization of this objective always remains a pious wish, we still are
not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working incessantly towards it. For this is
our duty, and to admit that the moral law within us is deceptive would call forth in us the
wish, which arouses our abhorrence, rather than to be rid of all reason and to regard ourselves
as thrown by one’s principles into the same mechanism of nature as all the other species of
animals.’ Kant 1996 [1797], 123 (6:355).
31 In his Holy Terror, Terry Eagleton reminds us that Hegel called this – also Kantian –
inspired notion of freedom – ‘the freedom of the void’ (Eagleton 2005, 71).
achievement. Formalism – that is to say, the use of the legal judgment – may of
course go wrong. Kant’s own view of the imaginative ability of lawyers was not too
flattering.29 Yet its key virtue lies in the cultural significance of the idea of the legal
form as the surface over which a better future may be built without automatically
sacrificing any substantive idea of what such future might be like – that is, without
sacrificing the (regulative idea) of freedom.30
Two notions of ‘freedom’ are at play in the contrast between empirical political
science and legal formalism: freedom as hubris and as freedom as enlightenment. The
former thinks of law in terms of strategic action. Because the law is indeterminate,
however, the decision ostensibly made in order to reach the instrumental optimum
becomes simply an existential affirmation of oneself; ‘infinite freedom’ as the
limitless search for jouissance, immersion in the pleasure principle, pre-genital
fixation and failure to reach maturity.31 But jouissance consummated is happiness
destroyed; and you must move on to the next pleasure, and then the next, and the
next…
Freedom as enlightenment (or self-determination) is precisely about casting
away that kind of self-incurred immaturity. If you do know the world, you know, too,
that your jouissance is no more valuable than that of your neighbour’s and that if
your jouissance is the only thing you pay attention to, well, then your neighbour will
call in the police before the night is over. Formalism does not ask ‘what should I do
in order to fulfil my preference’ but ‘what ought I to do in view of the justified claims
others may make on me’? The attention to the form – the legal text, the principle, the
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32 The best description of this is Fischer-Lescano & Teubner 2006.
precedent – reconstructs the social bond in terms of legal obligation. The legal ought
– the substanceless form of the law – signals an ‘orientation in thinking’ rather than
a set of positive laws or institutions. It is a cultural practice that aims to integrate the
claims of others and in which I myself am called to respect the procedural duties of
honesty, impartiality, avoidance of coercion, and accountability.
The fragmentation of the international world cannot be wished away. Different
rationalities call for realisation in the international world without the prospect of a
meta-rationality that could one day recreate a lost hierarchy.32 Kant was clear that
however useful these rationalities were in resolving technical and instrumental
problems, they should not possess binding force on free human beings. Instead,
freedom lay in the ability of the self to judge these rationalities from the perspective
of universalisable maxims. This, as a long line of critics from Hegel onwards has
argued, can hardly be sustained. The self is not external to the rationalities but also a
product of them. It follows that ‘freedom’ cannot mean rational self-legislation by an
autonomous or transcendental subject. Instead, freedom would become an ability to
avoid being immersed or ‘locked into’ any particular technical or scientific discourse
or cognitive vocabulary. Instead of a realisation of some authenticity it would mean
living in the ‘comfortable inauthenticity’ of formalism (Tadros 2000). This would
give a kind of post-modern shift to the Kantian view of enlightenment as the spiritual
regeneration of the self. Cultivation of virtue would then become learning formalism
as a way of orienting one’s thinking towards the regulative ideals of a society of free
republics and a cosmopolitan law. This work on the self aims beyond uncritical
assimilation of either the utopia of rationalism or the apology of (empirical) realism.
Accepting as a cultural premise and as the structure of its preferred subject-position
the reality of progress.
I have elsewhere argued about the ‘wonderful artificialty of statehood’ – that is
to say, the formal State as the surface over which social rationalities may compete for
influence (Koskenniemi 1994). The argument for formalism in international law is
analogous. Formalism is not a binding rationale itself but a cultural disposition, a
commitment (‘calling’) to work in an indeterminate setting of competing substantive
rationalities with full knowledge of their indeterminacy and their conflict and a sense
of accountability for the (indeterminate) judgments one makes. To work as a
formalist is to enter a tangled web of discourses none of which can be held as fully
authoritative; with the objective of justifying one’s decision by reference to the law
and thereby addressing others in terms of a horizon of aspirations that can only be
shared inasmuch as we view ourselves as humans, entitled to work for that which
Kant’s romantic mind labelled the ‘Kingdom of ends’.
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